Abstract. Let α ∈ (0, 1) R be irrational and Gn = G n,1/n α be the random graph on [n] with edge probability 1/n α ; we know that it satisfies the 0-1 law for first order logic. We deal with the failure of the 0-1 law for stronger logics: L ∞,k , k large enough and the LFP, least fix point logic.
§ 0. Introduction § 0(A). The Question.
Let G n,p be the random graph with set of nodes [n] = {1, . . . , n}, each edge of probability p ∈ [0, 1] R , the edges being drawn independently, see ⊞ 2 below. On 0-1 laws (and random graphs) see the book of Spencer [Spe01] or Alon-Spencer [AS08] , in particular on the behaviour of the random graph G n,1/n α for α ∈ (0, 1) R irrational. On finite model theory see Flum-Ebbinghaus [EF06] , e.g. on the logic L ∞,k (see §1) and on LFP (least fixed point 1 ) logic. A characteristic example of what can be expressed by it is "in the graph G there is a path from the node x to node y"; this is closed to what we use. We know that G n,p , i.e. p constant satisfies the 0-1 law for first order logic (proved independently by Fagin [Fag76] and ). This holds also for many stronger logics like L ∞,k and LFP logic. If α ∈ (0, 1) R is irrational, the 0-1 law holds for G n,(1/n α ) and first order logic, see e.g. [AS08] .
The question we address is whether this holds also for stronger logics as above. Though our main aim is to address the problem for the case of graphs, the proof seems more transparent when we have two random graph relations (we make them directed graphs just for extra transparency). So here we shall deal with two cases A and B. In Case A, the usual graph, we have to show that there are (just first order) formulas ϕ ℓ (x, y) for ℓ = 1, 2 with some special properties (actually also ϕ 0 ), see Claim 1.2. For Case B, those formulas are R ℓ (x, y), ℓ = 1, 2, the two directed graph relations. Note that (for Case B), the satisfaction of the cases of the R ℓ are decided directly by the drawing and so are independent, whereas for Case A there are (small) dependencies for different pairs, so the probability estimates are more complicated.
In the case of constant probability p ∈ (0, 1) R , the 0-1 law is strong: it is obtained by proving elimination of quantifier and it works also for stronger logics: L ∞,k (see §2) and so also for the LFP logic L LFP . Another worthwhile case is:
⊞ 1 G n,1/n α where α ∈ (0, 1) R ; so p n = 1/n α .
Again the edges are drawn independently but the probability depends on n. The 0-1 law holds if α is irrational, but we have elimination of quantifiers only up to (Boolean combinations of) existential formulas. Do we have 0-1 law also for those stronger logics? We shall show that by proving that for some so called scheme of interpretationφ, for random enough G n ,φ interpret number theory up to m n where m n is not too small, e.g. m n ≥ log 2 log 2 (n).
A somewhat related problem asks whether for some logic the 0-1 law holds for G n,p (e.g. p = 1 2 ) but does not have the elimination of quantifiers, see [Sh:1077] . We now try to informally describe the proof, naturally concentrating on case B. Fix reals α 1 < α 2 from (0, 1 4 ) R for transparency, soᾱ = (α 1 , α 2 ) letting α(ℓ) = α ℓ ; ⊞ 2 let the random digraph G n,ᾱ = ([n], R 1 , R 2 ) = ([n], R Gn,ᾱ 1 (a) for each a = b, we draw a truth value for R 2 (a, b) with probability 1 n 1−α 2 for yes (b) for each a = b, we draw a truth value for R 1 (a, b) with probability 1 n 1+α 1 for yes (c) those drawings are independent. Now for random enough digraph G = G n = G n,ᾱ = ([n], R 1 , R 2 ) and node a ∈ G; we try to define the set S k = S G,a,k of nodes of G not from ∪{S m : m < k} by induction on k as follows:
For k = 0 let S k = {a}. Assume S 0 , . . . , S k has been chosen, and we shall choose S k+1 .
⊞ 3 For ι = 1, 2 we ask: is there an R ι -edge (a, b) with a ∈ S k and b not from
If the answer is no for both ι = 1, 2 we stop and let height(a, G) = k. If the answer is yes for ι = 1, we let S k+1 be the set of b such that for some a the pair (a, b) is as above for ι = 1. If the answer is no for ι = 1 but yes for ι = 2 we define S k+1 similarly using ι = 2. Let the height of G be max{height(a, G) : a ∈ G}. Now we can prove that for every random enough G n , for a ∈ G n or easier -for most a ∈ G n , for every not too large k we have:
⊞ 4 S Gn,a,k is on the one hand not empty and on the other hand with ≤ n 2α2 members. This is proved by drawing the edges not all at once but in k stages. In stage m ≤ k we already can compute S Gn,a,0 , . . . , S Gn,a,m and we have already drawn all the R 1 -edges and R 2 -edges having first node in S Gn,a,0 ∪ · · · ∪ S Gn,a,m−1 ; that is for every such pair (a, b) we draw the truth values of R 1 (a, b), R 2 (a, b). For m = 0 this is clear. So arriving to m we can draw the edges having the first node in S m and not dealt with earlier, and hence can compute S m+1 .
The point is that in the question ⊞ 3 above, if the answer is yes for ι = 1 then the number of nodes in S m+1 will be small, almost surely smaller than in S m because its expected value is
the drawings are independent so except for an event of very small probability this is what will occur. Further, if for ι = 1 the answer is no but for ι = 2 the answer is yes then almost surely S m is smaller than a number near n α1 but it is known that the R 2 -valency of any node of G n is near to n α2 . Of course, the "almost surely" is such that the probability that at least one undesirable event mentioned above occurs is negligible.
So the desired inequality holds. By a similar argument, if we stop at k then there is no R 2 -edge from
there are many nodes, e.g. at least near n/2 by a crude argument. As each S m is not too large necessarily the height of G n is large. The next step is to express in our logic the relation {(a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 ): for some k 1 , k 2 we have b 1 ∈ S Gn,a1,k1 , b 2 ∈ S Gn,a2,k2 and k 1 ≤ k 2 }.
By this we can interpret a linear order with height(G n ) members. Again using the relevant logic this suffice to interpret number theory up to this height. Working more we can define a linear order with n elements, so can essentially find a formula "saying" n is even (or odd).
For random graphs we have to work harder: instead of having two relations we have two formulas; one of the complications is that their satisfaction for the relevant pairs are not fully independent.
In [Sh:1096] we shall deal with the strong failure of the 0-1 for Case A, i.e. G n,p α , (e.g. can "express" n is even) and also intend to deal with the α rational case. The irrationality can be replaced by discarding few exceptions.
We thank the referee for helping to improve the presentation. § 0(B). History.
The history is non-trivial having non-trivial opaque points. I have a clear memory of the events but vague on the exact statements and more so on the proof (and a concise entry in my (private F-list, [Sh:F159])) that in January 1996, in a Conference in DIMACS, Monica McArthur gave a lecture claiming that the graph G n,α satisfies the 0-1 law not only for first order logic (by Shelah-Spencer [ShSp:304]) but also for a stronger logic. Joel Spencer said this can be contradicted in a way he outlined. I thought on this and saw further things (explain to her saying more and) wrote them in a letter to Monica and Joel. I understood that it was agreed that Monica would write a paper with us saying more but eventually she left academia.
As the referee found out, MacArthur's claim in [?] (DIMACS): failure of the law in L ω ∞,ω , but refers the proof to a paper in preparation with Spencer that never appeared. She claims also that there is 0-1 law for L k ∞,ω if k = [1/α], referring again to the paper in preparation. The later claim is not contradicted by the results of this paper. Lynch [Lyn97] , refers also to a joint paper with McArthur and Spencer that never appeared proving that for the TC (= transitive closure) logic satisfies the 0-1 law.
Having sent Joel (in 2011) an earlier version of this paper, his recollection of talking to Monica was that "we hadn't really gotten a handle on the situation". The intention was that it would appear in the Yurifest, commemorating Yuri Gurevich's 75th birthday, but it was not in a final version in time, so only a short version (with the abstract and §(0A)) appear in the Yurifest volume, [Sh:1061]. § 0(C). Preliminaries.
Notation 0.1. 1) n ∈ N\{0} will be used for "G n ∈ K n random enough". 2) G, H denote graphs and M, N denote more general structures = models. 3) a, b, c, d, e denote nodes of graphs or elements of structures. 4) m, k, ℓ denote natural numbers. 5) τ denotes a vocabulary, M a model with vocabulary τ = τ M (see 0.1(9),(10) below). 6) L denotes a logic, L is first order logic, so L(τ ) is first order language (= set of formulas) for the vocabulary τ . L (τ ) is the language for the logic L and the vocabulary τ . 7) L LFP is the least fix point logic, short hand LFP. 8) (a) Let k A be the set of sequences η of length k of members of A, i.e. η = a 0 , . . . , a k−1 where ℓ<k a ℓ ∈ A, so a ℓ = η(ℓ).
(b) For a set u, e.g. of natural number letx
9) Let τ gr denote the vocabulary of graphs, but we may write
So τ gr consists of one two-place predicate R, (below always interpreted as a symmetric irreflexive relation). 10) Let τ dg denote the vocabularies of bound directed graphs, so it consists of two two-place predicates, below always interpreted as irreflexive relations. Let τ N be the vocabulary of number theory, see 0.2(1). 11) We define the function log * from R ≥0 to N by: log * (x) is 0 if x < 2 log * (x) is log * (log 2 (x)) + 1 if x ≥ 2 12) |u| is the cardinality = the number of elements of a set u.
Explanation 0.2. 1) Above recall that the vocabulary of the model = the structure N, number theory, is the set of symbols {0, 1, +, ×, <} where 0,1 are individual constants (interpreted in N as the corresponding elements) and +, × are two-place function symbols interpreted as + N , × N the two-place functions of addition and multiplication, and < is a two-place predicate (= relation symbol) interpreted as < N , the usual order on N. 2) In general (A) a vocabulary is a set of predicates, individual constants and function symbols each with a given arity = number of places; individual constants (like 0,1 above) are considered as 0-place function symbols (B) a τ -model or a τ -structure M consists of: (a) its universe, |M |, a non-empty set of elements so M is their number
Definition 0.3. Let τ be a finite vocabulary, for simplicity with predicates only or we just consider a function as a relation. Here we use τ gr , τ dg only except when we interpret. 1) We sayφ is in a (τ * , τ )-scheme of interpretaion when : (if τ is clear from the context we may write τ * -scheme)
is always an equivalence relation on {y : (ϕ(y, y)}; if ϕ = is (x 0 = x 1 ) then we may omit it.
2) For a τ -model M (here a graph or diagram) andφ as above, let N = N M,φ be the following structure:
Recall that here "for every random enough G n " is a central notion. 
(d) the random structure is called G n = G µn and we tend to speak on G µn rather than on the context.
2) For a given 0-1 context, let "for every random enough G n we have G n |= ψ, i.e. G satisfies ψ" and "if G n is random enough then ψ", etc. means that the sequence Prob(G n |= ψ) : n ∈ N converge to 1; of course, Prob(G n |= ψ) = Σ{µ n (G) : G ∈ K n and G |= ψ}.
3) Forp = p n = p(n) : n a sequence of probabilities, G n,p is the case K n = graphs on [n] and we draw the edges independently (a) with probability p whenp is constantly p, e.g. , and (b) with probability p(n) or p n when p is a function from N to [0, 1] R .
Below we add the second context because for it the proof is more transparent.
Context 0.5. 1) Case A:
2) Case B:
2 ) where α * 1 , α * 2 ∈ (0, 1/4) are irrational numbers, (natural to add linearly independent over Q) hence 0 < α * 1 < α * 2 < α * 2 + α * 2 < 1/2 and let α * 0 = α * 1 . Definition 0.6. For Case A:
2) For α ∈ (0, 1) R let G n = G n;α be the random graph on [n] with the probability of an edge being 1/n α and the drawing of the edges being independent. 3) Let µ n = µ n;α be the corresponding distribution on K 1 n ; so µ n :
The more transparent related case is the following Definition 0.8. On Case B, for G n;ᾱ : 1) Recall τ dg is the vocabulary {R 1 , R 2 } intended to be two directed graph relations.
) with R 1 , R 2 irreflexive relations be drawn as follows:
(a) for each a = b, we draw a truth value for R 2 (a, b) with probability 1 n 1−α 2 for yes (b) for each a = b, we draw a truth value for R 1 (a, b) with probability 1 n 1+α 1 for yes (c) those drawings are independent. 4) We define the distribution µ n;ᾱ as follows:
(a) µ n = µ n;ᾱ = µ n;α1,α2 is the following distributions on K 2 n :
n for µ n;ᾱ so n is large enough.
Observation 0.9. For random enough (recalling 0.4(2)) G n = G n;ᾱ = G n;α1,α2 :
(a) For a ∈ [n], the expected value of the R 2 -valency of a, that is, |{b : aR
(b) for every random enough G n;ᾱ for every a ∈ [n] this number is close enough to n α(1) , e.g.
2 We may change the definition of K 2 n by requiring R G 1 ∩ R G 2 = ∅, this makes little difference. We could further demand R ℓ is asymmetric, i.e. (a, b) ∈ R G ℓ ⇒ (b, a) / ∈ R G 0 , again this makes little difference.
• 2 for some ε ∈ (0, α 1 ) R , the probability of the difference being ≥ n α(1)(1−ε)
for at least one a ∈ [n], goes to zero with n (c) the expected number of R 1 -edges is n(n − 1)/n +(1+α1)
As the proof for L ∞,k is simpler and more transparent than for LFP, we shall explain it.
First, we try to define and then explain the logic L ∞,k for k a finite number. For a vocabulary τ , we define the set L ∞,k (τ ) of formulas as the closure of the set of atomic formulas under some operation similarly to first order logic, but:
• we restrict ourselves to formulas having < k free variables • we allow arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions (that is even infinite 3 ones)
• as in first order logic we allow negation ¬ϕ and existential quantifier (on one variable) ∃xϕ(x,ȳ).
So any formula in L ∞,k not just have only < k free variables but also every subformula has. It may be helpful to recall the standard game which express equivalence. Recall (0.3(1)) that for transparency we assume the vocabulary below has only predicates and is finite.
⊞ we say F is an (M 1 , M 2 ) − L ∞,k -equivalence witness when for some vocabulary τ with predicates only (a) M 1 , M 2 are τ -models (b) F is a non-empty set of partial isomorphisms from
, 2} and a ι ∈ M ι then there is g such that g ∈ F , f ↾A ⊆ g and ι = 1 ⇒ a ι ∈ dom(g) and ι = 2 ⇒ a ι ∈ rang(g).
Now
⊕ 1 for M 1 , M 2 as in (a) of ⊞ above, the following are equivalent:
a formula with no free variables,
. . , a k−1 ∈ M 1 and g ∈ F and {a ℓ : ℓ < k} ⊆ dom(g) then for every formula ϕ(x 0 , . . . ,
Having explained the logic, how can we prove for it the failure of the 0-1 law? Consider Case B where we have two kinds of edges, R 1 and R 2 . Consider η a sequence from k {1, 2}, see 0.1(11) and a = b. There may be (η, 0, k)-pre-paths from a to b in G, see Definition 1.6, i.e. a = a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k = b such that (a ℓ , a ℓ+1 ) is an R η(ℓ) -edge for ℓ < k. Now depending on η there may be many such pre-paths or few. If η is constantly 2 and k > 1/α * 2 then there are many such pre-paths -as fixing a in G n,ᾱ * the expected number of b's for which there is pre-(η, 0, k)-paths from a to b is 1 for k = 0, is ≈ n α * 2 for k = 1 is ≈ n 2α * 2 for k = 2, etc., so for k > 1/α * 2 it is every b ∈ G n ; not helpful. If η is constantly 1, there are few such pre-paths and they are all short, even ≤ k for any random enough G n , when 1 < α * 1 k, not helpful. But we may choose a "Goldilock's" η, that is, such that for every initial segment of η the expected number is not too large and not too small. This means that for some a for every k ′ ≤ k for some b there is such a pre-path but not too many. We need more so that we can define by a formula from L ∞,k the set S Gn,a,k ′ := {b: there is such pre-path from a to b of length k ′ but not a shorter pre-path} and it is = ∅; moreover we can define the natural order on the set {S Gn,a,k : k ≤ n}. Fact 1.4 below indicates what kind of η's we need, and we use it proving 1.8; however in later sections, because we have to estimate the probabilities, we shall use only a closely related definition. (a) 0 < α * 1 < α * 0 < α * 2 < α * 2 + α * 2 are reals with α * ℓ ∈ (0, 1/4) R and γ * ℓ ∈ R >0 (b) ϕ ℓ (x, y) are first order formulas (in the vocabulary of graphs) even existential positive formulas such that ϕ ℓ (x, y) ⊢ x = y for random enough G n;ᾱ (c) if G n;ᾱ is random enough then for every a ∈ G n;ᾱ the set ϕ 2 (G n;ᾱ , a) has ≈ γ * ℓ n α * 2 elements, i.e. for some ε ∈ (0, 1) R , if G n;ᾱ is random enough, then for every a ∈ [n], the number of members of ϕ 1 (G n;ᾱ , a) belongs to the interval (γ * ℓ n
Remark 1.3. We shall use not just the statements but also the proofs of 1.2, 1.4.
Proof. Also here we shall use freely the analysis of G n;α for α ∈ (0, 1) R irrational (see, e.g. [AS08] ). Let m * 2 , n * 2 be such that:
2 is positive but, e.g. < For ℓ = 1, 2, let γ * ℓ = 1. So for any n large enough compared to n * 1 , n * 2 and a 1 = a 2 ∈ [n], the set F := {f : f is a one-to-one function from [ 
For each f ∈ F the probability of the event E f = "f maps every edge of H * 2
to an edge of G n,α " is (
. Clearly as in 0.9 the expected value is as required in clause (c) and by the well known analysis of G nα (see, e.g. [AS08] ), clause (c) holds and see more in §4.
Clause (d) is proved similarly.
1.2
Fact 1.4. There is a sequence η ∈ N {1, 2} such that: for every n > 0,
We choose η(n) by induction on n. Let η(n) be 2 if γ n ≤ α * 2 , e.g. n = 0 and η(n) be 1 if γ n > α * 2 . Easily η is as required.
1.4
Claim 1.5. 1) If η is as in 1.4 then for any m and every random enough G n , there is an (η, m)-path in G n , see below.
2) Moreover, also there is an (η, ε⌊log(n)⌋-path and even an (η, ⌊n ε ⌋)-path for appropriate ε ∈ R >0 .
Proof. As in [AS08] on G n,1/n α and see more in §3. 
2) Above we say "(ν, m 1 , m 2 )-path" when in addition:
3) We say "ā is a (pre)-(ν, m 1 , m 2 )-path from a to b" when in addition a m1 = a ∧ a m2 = b.
Remark 1.7. 1) Note that if a ℓ : ℓ ≤ m is a pre-(ν, m)-path, it is possible that ℓ 1 + 1 < ℓ 2 ≤ m and a ℓ1 = a ℓ2 . For a (ν, m)-path this is impossible. 2) In 1.6(2)(c), really the case ℓ 2 = m 2 suffice. 3) We use the "log(n)" Case in 1.5(2), but having log(log(n)) and even much less has no real affect on the proof. Conclusion 1.8. Let k ≥ max{n * 0 , n * 1 , n * 2 } then G n fails the 0-1 law for L ∞,k . Remark 1.9. 1) Note that if a ℓ : ℓ ≤ m is a pre-(ν, m)-path, it is possible that ℓ 1 + 1 < ℓ 2 ≤ m and a ℓ1 = a ℓ2 . For a (ν, m)-path this is impossible. 2) In 1.6(2)(c), really the case ℓ 2 = m 2 suffice. 3) We use the "log(n)" case in 1.5(2), but having log log(n) and even much less has no real affect on the proof.
Note that we rely on 1.5(2) but we prove more in §3.
Proof. For a finite graph G and η as in 1.4 or any η ∈ N {1, 2} let length η (G) be the maximal m such that there is an (η, m)-path in G.
Now consider the statement
Why ⊕ is enough? Because then we let ψ = {(ψ m ∧ ¬ψ m+1 ) : m ≥ 10 and (log * (m) is even)} where log * (m) is essentially the inverse of the tower function, see 0.1(3). Note that using 1.4, 1.5(2), of course, we should be able to say much more. Why ⊕ is true? First, we define the formula ψ m1,m2 (x, y) for m 1 ≤ m 2 by induction on m 2 − m 1 as follows:
path from a to b.
Second, we define ψ
This just formalizes 1.6(2)(c) so
iff there is an (η, m 2 )-path from a to b. As said above this is enough. Note that complicating the sentence we may weaken the demand on G n .
§ 2. The LFP Logic
In this section we try to interpret an initial segment of number theory in a random enough G ∈ K n , i.e. with set of nodes [n]. In Definition 2.2 for G ∈ K n and a ∈ G we define a model M G,a . Now in M ∈ M G,a * , the equivalence classes of E M represent natural numbers. Concentrating on Case B, starting with {a * } as the first equivalence class, usually its set of R 2 -neighbors will be the second equivalence class. Generally, if for an equivalence class a/E M we let the next one be the set suc(a/E M ) = {b ∈ G : R 2 (a ′ , b) for some a ′ ∈ a/E M }, then we expect that suc(A/E M ) has ≈ |a/E M |·n α2 members. So if we continue in this way, shortly we get the equivalence classes cover essentially all the nodes of G. Hence we try to sometimes use the R 1 -neighbors instead of the R 2 -neighbors, but when? For L ∞,k (τ * ) we can decide a priori, e.g.use η as in 1.4 and the proof of 1.8 so that the expected number will be small. But for LFP logic this is not clear, so we just say: use the R 1 -neighbors if there is at least one and the R 2 -neighbors otherwise, so this is close to what is done in 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 but not the same.
For case A we use ϕ ℓ -neighbors instead of R ℓ -neighbors for ℓ = 1, 2 except that the question on existence is for ϕ 0 -neighbors.
How do we from equivalence relations and the successor relation re-construct the initial segment of number theory? This is exactly the power of definition by induction.
Naturally we need just ⊞ letting height(G) be the maximal number of E M -equivalence classes for M ∈ M G,a , a ∈ G, we have: ( * ) for every m, for every random enough G n , m ≤ height(G), moreover letting f : N → N be f (n) = log * (n) for every random enough
For failure of 0-1 laws, ⊞ is enough, but we may wish to prove a stronger version, say finding a sentence ψ which for every random enough G n , G n satisfies ψ iff n is even. We intend to return to it elsewhere; but for now note that for a set A ⊆ G we can define (R is R 2 for Case B, ϕ 2 for Case A) cℓ Gn (A) = {b : b ∈ A or b ∈ G\A but for no c ∈ G\A\{a} do we have (∀x ∈ A)[R(x, c) ≡ R(x, b)]}. Now from a definition of a linear order on A we can derive one on cℓ Gn (A). We can replace R by any formula ϕ(x, y). Now in our context, if we know that, with parameters, we define such A of size ≈ n ε for appropriate ε then we can define a linear order on [n]; why there is such A? because if M ∈ M G,a * and k is not too large then there is b ∈ M, lev(b, M ) = k such that there is a unique maximal < (A) (case A of 0.5) the vocabulary τ * is τ gr , the one for the class of graphs, ϕ ℓ (x, y), ℓ = 0, 1, 2 are as in 1.2 so ∈ L(τ * ) andᾱ
2 ) are as in 0.5(2) and G n = G n;ᾱ * and ϕ ℓ (x, y) = xR ℓ y for ℓ = 1, 2, with G n , K 2 n as in Definition 0.8 and let α * 0 = α * 1 , ϕ 0 (x, y) = ϕ 1 (x, y).
2) We may omit ι above when : ι = 1 iff ( * ) holds where: ( * ) there is c ∈ M such that lev(c, M ) = k = height(G) and for some b ∈ G\M we have G |= ϕ 0 [b, c]; yes not ϕ 1 ! but for case B there is no difference.
3) For a sentence ψ in the vocabulary τ 1 ∪ τ * , (see 2.1, 2.2), for M, N ∈ M G,a , we say N is the ψ-successor of M when for some ι ∈ {1, 2}, N is the ι-successor of M and (G, M ) |= ψ ⇔ (ι = 1). 4) For G ∈ K n , a * ∈ G and M ∈ M G,a * we define N M,a * as the following structure N with the vocabulary of number theory:
. Claim 2.4. 1) If ι, G, M, a are as in 2.3(1) then there is at most one ι-successor N of M in M G,a . 1A) For some ψ * ∈ L(τ 1 ∪τ * ), being a ψ * -successor is equivalent to being a successor. 2) For a given G ∈ K n , a ∈ G, M ∈ M G,a and ψ ∈ L(τ 1 ∪ τ * ) there is at most one ψ-successor N of M in M G,a . 3) For G ∈ K n and a ∈ G there is one and only one sequence
of course, ϕ depends on ψ but not on G, a (and k). 4) In the LFP logic for τ * , we can find a sequenceφ of formulas with 6 variable x 0 , . . . , y such that: for any G ∈ K n and a ∈ G, the sequenceφ substituting y by a defines M = M G,a which is M k,a for k = k G,a,ψ from part (3). 4A) For ψ as in 2.3(3), i.e. ψ ∈ L(τ 1 ∪τ * ) , a sentence, the parallel of 2.4(3),(4), (5) holds for "ψ-successor", (so we should write M G,a,ψ instead M G,a ). 5 No real harm to demand here (and in 2.2) "unique" 6 The variable y stands for the parameters a; instead we may define in 2.3 one model M k coding all M a,ℓ ∈ M G,a for ℓ ≤ k, a ∈ G. § 3. Revisiting induction
As discussed in §2, we need to prove that for random enough G n , height(G n ) is large enough, equivalently, for some a ∈ G n (we shall prove that even for most), height(a, G n ) is large enough. For this a more detailed specific statement is proved -see ( * ) in the proof of 3.3. That is, we prove that for most a ∈ G n (for random enough G n ): on the one hand M G,a,=k is not too large, and, on the other hand, is not empty; and for Case A, even not too small. The computation naturally depends on what η G,a is, see 3.2(3), this is a delicate point.
For Case B, things are simpler. For each k we ask if there is an R 1 -edge out of M G,a,=k to G\M G,a,k . If there is, clearly M G,a,=k+1 will be quite small but not empty. If not, then necessarily M G,a,=k has ≤ n α * 2 −ζ members hence the number of R 2 -neighbors of members of M G,a,=k cannot be too large (well < n α * 2 n α * 2 ) so we are done.
Case A seems harder, so we simplify considering only small enough k, see 3.4, hence we can consider all possible η's of length k, that is, summing the probability of the "undesirable" events on all of them; so if each has small enough probability, even the unions of all those events has small enough probability. Now we divide the η's to those which are "reasonable candidates to be η Gn,a " and those which are not. For the former η's, for almost all a ∈ G n there is a pre-(η, 0, k * )-path starting with a. So it is enough to prove that for almost all a ∈ G n , η G,a ↾k * is one of those former η's where k * is the relevant large enough height, e.g. ≥ ⌊log 2 (log 2 (n))⌋. For this it is enough to prove that the other η's cannot occur and this is what we do.
We in this section fulfill promises from §2 (and §1).
Context 3.1. As in 2.1.
Below we shall use Definition 3.2. 1) For G ∈ K n we define M k (a, G) = M G,a,k by induction as in 2.4(3) for ψ = ψ * from 2.4(1A) and also k = k G,a as there and height(G) as in 2.4(6).
2) Let M G,a,=k = M G,a,k \ ∪ {M G,a,m : m < k} and similarly M G,a,<k .
3) Let η = η G,a be the following sequence of length k G,a : if ℓ < k G,ℓ , then η(ℓ) = ι(ℓ, M G,a ) ∈ {1, 2} from Definition 2.2(B)(c).
Claim 3.3. For small enough ε ∈ (0, 1) R , for random enough G n , for some a ∈ [n], k Gn,a ≥ k * = ⌊n ε ⌋ in case B and k Gn,a ≥ ⌊log(log(n))⌋ in case A.
Remark 3.4. It would be nice to use an η ∈ N {1, 2} defined similarly to 1.4, say such that γ n ∈ [α * 0 , α * 2 + α * 2 ], but this is not clear. In case B, in the proof the problem is that the γ n -s from 1.4 may be very near to α * 0 . Also the parallel problem for case A is that the answer to the question asked there is near the critical stage, so we are not almost sure about the answer.
Proof. For case A, we presently prove it, e.g. for k * = ⌊log 2 (log 2 n)⌋ and for Case B, ⌊n ε ⌋, an overkill, but this suffices for the failure of the 0-1 law. We intend to fill the general case elsewhere. Actually for any ε ∈ (0, 1) R we can get k * = ⌊n 1−ε ⌋. Let ζ ∈ (0, 1) R be small enough and k * be as above. Clearly it is enough to prove: ( * ) if a ∈ [n] and k < k * then the probability that at least one of the following (i) a,k , (ii) a,k , (iii) a,k fails (assuming ℓ < k ⇒ (i) a,ℓ ∧(ii) a,ℓ ) is small enough; < 1 k log(n) suffices, being < 1 kn i for each i for large enough n is natural) (i) a,k k ≤ k Gn,a (ii) a,k M Gn,a=k has ≤ n α * 2 +α * 2 elements (iii) a,k M Gn,a,k , (noting that (i) a,k implies M Gn,ℓ,k = ∅) has ≥ n α * 0 −ζ elements 7 except when k = 0, not need for Case B.
Why does ( * ) hold?
Case 1 Case B of the Context 2.1 and Definition 0.8 We are given n ≥ 1 and a ∈ [n]; we draw the edges in k stages so by induction on k. For k = 0 draw the edges starting with a (of both kinds, an overkill), i.e. for ι ∈ {1, 2} the truth value of R ι (a, b) for every b ∈ [n]\{a}, hence we can compute M 1 (a, G).
The induction hypothesis on stage k is that M G,a,i : i ≤ k have been computed and we have drawn the truth value of R ι (c, b) for b ∈ ∪{M G,a,i : i < k} and c ∈ [n]\{b}. If k < k * we now draw the edges R ι (b, c) for b ∈ M G,a,=k and any c = b; actually the c ∈ M G,i,k are irrelevant and so we can compute M G,a,k+1 . Now we ask: if (i) a,m + (ii) a,m holds for m ≤ k what is the probability that (i) a,k+1 + (ii) a,k+1 ? (recalling (iii) a,k+1 is irrelevant), i.e., is it small enough? This is easy and as required.
In details, we ask Question: Are there c ∈ [n]\M G,a,k and b ∈ M G,a,=k such that (b, c) ∈ R G 1 ? First note ( * ) if |M G,a,=k | ≥ n α * 2 −ζ then the probability that the answer is no is < 1/2 n .
[Why? We have M G,a,=k × ([n]\M G,a,k ) independent drawings so their number is ≥ n α * 2 −ζ n/2, each with probability So (x, y, a, b) defines a linear order on [n]\M G,a,k * which has ≥ n − ⌊n ζ ⌋ elements. We get using the same trick ψ 4 ∈ L LFP (τ dn ) and ψ 4 (x, y, a, b) defines a linear order on [n] . Now the formulas ψ 0 , . . . , ψ 4 do not depend on n. Also for some ψ 5 ∈ L LFP (τ dg )
• G |= So the interpretation should be clear.
3.5
Conclusion 3.6. [Case B] For some ψ ∈ L LFP (τ dg ) for every random enough G n = G n;ᾱ * we have:
• G n |= ψ iff n is even.
